




Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit:
The Next Frontier
Neil B. Cohen
Brooklyn Law School, neil.cohen@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the International Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Other Law Commons, and the
Secured Transactions Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 173 (1998)
Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured
Credit: The Next Frontier
NEIL B. COHENt
SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF SECURED CREDIT ............................................ 174
A. The Need for Credit Enhancement ..................................................................... 174
B. Security Interests as Credit Enhancement Devices ........................................... 175
II. THE COSTS OF DISHARMONY ..................................................................................... 176
A. The Extent of Disharmony ................................................................................. 176
B. The Effects of Disharmony ................................................................................. 177
III. PROSPECTS FOR HARMONIZATION ............................................................................. 178
A. The 1977 UNCITRAL Study ............................................................................ 178
B. Is 1997Different? .............................................................................................. 179
1. Initiatives by International Organizations ................................................... 181
(a) UNIDROIT .......................................................................................... 181
(i) Factoring ....................................................................................... 181
(ii) Mobile Goods ............................................................................... 182
(b) UNCITRAL .......................................................................................... 182
2. Foreign Law Initiatives ............................................................................... 183
(a) Initiatives in Former Soviet Republics and Soviet-
Dominated States ................................................................................. 183
(i) European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ................................................................................. 183
(ii) CEELI ........................................................................................... 184
(iii) The IRIS Project ........................................................................... 184
(iv) The Commercial Law Project for Ukraine ................................... 184
(b) Other Developing Economies (World Bank Projects) ......................... 185
(c) NAFTA Countries ................................................................................ 185
(d) Developed Countries ........................................................................... 185
C. The ALl International Secured Transactions Project ........................................ 186
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 188
t S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., New York University School of Law (Root-Tilden
Scholar); Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School; Counsel to Bingham Dana LLP in Boston. Professor Cohen
has also been a Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law and a Visiting Professor at Columbia
Law School. Professor Cohen was the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Suretyship and Guaranty (1996). At present, he is Reporter both for the Drafting Committee revising Article I
of the Uniform Commercial Code and for the ALI's International Secured Transactions Project. Professor Cohen
has served as a member of the United States delegation to the UNCITRAL Working Group on Assignments in
International Receivables Financing since 1995 and currently serves as the American Law Institute's Adviser to
the Drafting Committee revising Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF SECURED CREDIT
It is certainly an honor for this paper to be included among those prepared for this
august symposium, but I feel a duty to explain the presence of this article. What, after all,
does secured credit have to do with international insolvency law?
The answer, both legally and economically, is "quite a bit." From a legal perspective,
the interactions between the secured credit and insolvency systems are obvious. In the
United States, for example, bankruptcy law refers to other bodies of law, including secured
credit law, in the course of determining the rights of parties asserting claims in bankruptcy.'
In addition, rights created under the aegis of secured credit law are sometimes vulnerable in
bankruptcy; for this reason, bankruptcy law is often considered the "acid test" of any
security interest. Yet the economic links between the systems are even closer than the legal
links.
A. The Needfor Credit Enhancement
The economic links between insolvency and secured transactions are simple, flowing
from a desire to facilitate mutually profitable credit transactions. In virtually all extensions
of credit, there is a fundamental economic reason-generation of profits-to seek or extend
credit. To the borrower, a potential extension of credit will be seen as profitable if the
borrower anticipates a greater return on the loaned funds than it will pay in interest.
Obviously, the interest rate to be charged in the transaction plays the major role in
determining whether the transaction will be seen as profitable. For the creditor, a
transaction may generate profits in two different ways. The profits flowing to the seller that
are generated by an extension of credit may be direct, derived from interest charges in
excess of the creditor's time value of the money, or indirect, such as when the credit
finances profitable sales (that might not otherwise have occurred) of the creditor's products
or services to buyers. Obviously, many transactions generate profits for creditors both
indirectly and directly-enabling a profitable sale that may not otherwise have taken place
and making a separate profit from the interest charged to the customer.
In any case, individual extensions of credit are profitable for creditors only when the
debtors' obligations are fulfilled, and an aggregate of credit extensions is profitable only if
the profits from the successful transactions 2 are greater than the losses from those in which
the debtor does not fully repay the credit. While in some cases a debtor's failure to fulfill
his or her obligations is due to dishonesty or unwillingness to pay, much more often the
failure springs directly from inability to perform. Inability to fulfill one's financial
obligations, of course, is part of the classic definition of insolvency.3 Thus, the risk of
debtor insolvency is a major (perhaps the major) determinant of whether a credit
transaction will be seen as profitable for the creditor.
Given the major impact on the creditor's profit or loss associated with a debtor's
insolvency, it is not surprising that if a creditor believes that the risk of nonpayment
associated with a particular proposed extension of credit is too high, that extension of credit
will likely not take place. This is the case because nonpayment would not only make that
transaction unprofitable, but would also more than offset gains from many other
1. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547 (1994).
2. In other words, those transactions in which the borrower fulfills its obligation.
3. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1995); see also I I U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994).
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transactions in which the debtors fully pay their debts.4 Similarly, a creditor considering
engaging in a particular class of credit extensions will not do so if the risk associated with
individual extensions within that class exceeds a certain threshold. Even if the chance that
any one debtor will default is relatively low, a small number of projected defaults will yield
a negative expected value for the entire class. It might seem that this problem could be
ameliorated for the creditor by simply raising the interest rate so that the profits from the
successful transactions are high enough to outweigh the losses from the unsuccessful
transactions. There are limits to this strategy, though, springing from the basic principle,
described above, that a transaction must be profitable for both sides in order to proceed.
Raising the interest rate, it must be remembered, decreases the likelihood that a transaction
will be profitable for the borrower. If the transaction is not seen as profitable by the
borrower, it will not take place. Thus, when the insolvency risk is high, it will often be the
case that the transaction, viewed ex ante, can be profitable for the creditor or for the debtor,
but not both.
Decisions not to extend credit are obviously unfortunate for the debtors who are
deprived of credit. They are also, however, a source of disappointment for prospective
creditors, since foregoing an extension of credit is foregoing a potentially profit-making
activity. Thus, both prospective debtors and prospective creditors have incentives to seek
ways to structure transactions so that they can be profitable for both parties.
Credit structures that reduce risk and enable a mutually profitable transaction are
sometimes called "credit enhancement" mechanisms. Credit enhancement, generally
speaking, is the art of structuring a transaction, through economic agreements and legal
mechanisms, so that the transaction is seen by both the creditor and the debtor as
prospectively profitable. In other words, the goal of credit enhancement is to minimize the
creditor's risk of loss due to nonperformance while nonetheless allowing the transaction to
be profitable for the debtor.
B. Security Interests as Credit Enhancement Devices
Credit enhancement devices are mechanisms that work to lower the creditor's
expected loss due to debtor nonperformance (thereby allowing the transaction to be
profitable to the creditor) while allowing the transaction to remain inexpensive enough to
be profitable to the debtor. These devices work by applying one or both of the following
two simple ideas: (1) making more assets reachable by the creditor to satisfy the claim and
(2) increasing the creditor's priority with respect to assets available to it. The first principle
is usually accomplished by arranging for a surety, guarantor, or other secondary obligor? to
4. Indeed, the loss associated with one defaulting debtor is typically several times greater than the profit
generated by a fully performing debtor. Take, for example, a one year $10,000 loan with an annual interest rate
of 8% when the creditor's cost of funds is 4.5% per year. The expected profit from this loan is $350. (This can
be calculated as follows: Assuming, for simplicity of illustration, that the creditor has no costs (other than its cost
of funds) associated with the loan and that the loan is payable in a single payment at the end of one year, the loan
would generate $800 in interest (8% of $10,000), but the creditor's cost of funds would be $450 (4.5% of
$10,000). The difference, then, between the interest charges and the cost of funds is $350.) Yet, let us assume
that the debtor defaults and, after an additional year of collection efforts, $3000 is recovered from the debtor.
The creditor's loss on the transaction would be $7920.25. (The creditor in this case has invested a total of
$10,920.25 ($10,000 plus two years' interest at 4.5% compounded annually) and received only $3000, leaving a
loss of $7920.25.) Obviously, a single default eliminates the profits generated by many fully performing
extensions of credit. See generally Neil B. Cohen, Credit Enhancement in Domestic Transactions:
Conceptualizing the Devices and Reinventing the Law, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 21 (1996).
5. The term "secondary obligor" is the generic term used in modem analyses to describe parties such as
guarantors that agree to be liable with respect to an obligation that is primarily the responsibility of another. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § I(1)(a) (1996).
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agree to liability with respect to the debtor's obligation. The second principle is fulfilled by
the use of collateral-the granting to the creditor of a "security interest" in specified assets
of the debtor. A security interest, of course, gives the secured creditor higher priority in
reaching those assets to satisfy the debt than would be the case if the creditor simply were
entitled to share the debtor's assets with all of the debtor's creditors. With this "first shot"
at the assets of the debtor it becomes possible for the debt to be paid in full, even if the
debtor becomes insolvent. The grant of a security interest decreases the creditor's risk of
loss and, accordingly, allows the creditor to enter into the credit transaction at an interest
rate low enough for the transaction to be profitable to the debtor. Thus, by reducing the
expected cost of insolvency risk, the security interest facilitates the transaction.
II. THE COSTS OF DISHARMONY
A. The Extent ofDisharmony
The differences in insolvency law (both substantive and procedural) among nations
create a serious problem in international credit transactions. In the context of a particular
failed transaction, the differences among insolvency regimes create one more battlefield to
be survived in the eventual allocation of the debtor's assets. In the context of transaction
planning (and pricing), though, these differences create uncertainty for the prospective
creditor. Because uncertainty makes a transaction less valuable in a world of risk aversion,
these differences result in higher interest rates or foregone transactions.
A similar phenomenon exists with respect to credit enhancement mechanisms such as
security interests that, when effective, ameliorate the effects of debtor insolvency. The
differences between secured credit regimes, in terms of both substantive principles and their
procedural effectuation, create uncertainty and transaction costs that lower the expected
value of a transaction to the creditor. Once again, these differences likely result in higher
interest rates and, in some cases, foregone transactions. Indeed, the problem may even be
worse, because secured credit law is designed to operate largely without court supervision.
The differences between secured credit regimes in different nations are quite
significant. Regimes differ, for example, as to whether they provide unified treatment for
virtually all security interests in one system (as is the case with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States) 6 or separate regimes for particular types of
collateral and particular types of transactions.7
Substantively, regimes differ as to the types of property in which a security interest
may be granted 8 and the creditors authorized to receive security interests.9 They also differ
6. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1995).
7. In Germany, for example, different statutes or rules govern the pledge (see §§ 1205-96 Btlrgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] (F.R.G.)), the seller's reservation of title (see § 455 BGB), the assignment of
claims (such as accounts receivable), and security (see Jens Hausmann, The Value of Public-Notice Filing Under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System of Securities in Personal
Property, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 427, 462-65 (1996)).
8. Compare, e.g., the United States in which a security interest governed by Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9 can be granted in almost every type of personal property or fixture (see U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-104 (1995)),
with Bolivia, where the "civil pledge" may be used only for goods used in hotels, industry, agriculture, and
ranching (see OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN REGION, How LEGAL
RESTRICTIONS ON COLLATERAL LIMIT ACCESS TO CREDIT IN BOLIVIA 18-19 (World Bank Report No. 13873-BO,
1994)) [hereinafter World Bank Report].
9. For example, in Mexico, a hipoteca industria (industrial mortgage) may only be taken by a Mexican-
incorporated credit institution (such as a bank). See "Ley de Instituciones de Crddito," art. 67, D.O., 18 de julio
de 1990.
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as to the ability of a debtor to grant a security interest in after-acquired or subsequently-
created property and whether one contract or conveyance can grant an interest in a mass of
individual items of collateral or, rather, individual conveyances are required.' 0 Most
important, they differ greatly with respect to the rules concerning priority of the secured
party as against other claimants of the collateral. Some priority contests are resolved by the
application of simple first-in-time, first-in-right rules," while others are resolved through
order of registration, or publicity, of the security interest.12 Finally, the secured credit
regimes differ as to whether transactions that are security interests in substance but not
form, such as conditional sales, are governed by the rules for security interests. 13
B. The Effects of Disharmony
Not surprisingly, the existence of different legal regimes that may govern an
international secured transaction can place many burdens on such transactions. Some of
those burdens merely add transaction costs to the extension of secured credit, while others
may result in restructuring a transaction or even foregoing it completely.
The first burden is quite simple. Ascertaining and complying with an unfamiliar rule
of law adds to the costs associated with closing a transaction, even if the governing law
turns out to work quite well for the particular extension of credit. These additional costs
may include increased attorneys' fees as well as other internal costs of time and effort.
Sometimes, though, matters will be more difficult. It may not be clear which state's
law will govern a particular secured transaction or whether one state will govern one aspect
of the transaction while the law of a different state will govern a different aspect. In some
secured transactions, such as a security interest in accounts, there can be a third party (such
as the account debtor) who is from still another state and whose law might govern all or
part of the transaction. In any event, the possibility that there will be a claimant to the
collateral who is from a different nation than the debtor or the creditor must be considered.
Thus, not only may it not be clear which state's law will govern, but it may also not be
obvious which states even have an interest in the transaction. Uncertainty about which law
governs has an impact on the value of transactions.
In some cases, the differences in governing law may have a more profound effect. A
transaction that can be accomplished easily under one legal regime may be difficult,
uncertain, or unduly expensive under another regime. For example, in the United States it
is quite simple for a debtor to grant an enforceable security interest in all of its accounts-
both those now existing and those that may come into existence in the future-in one
transaction."4  In many other countries, though, such a transaction would have to be
structured quite differently, in some because a security interest cannot be granted in
property not yet in existence, while in others because a security interest in individual
accounts cannot be conveyed in one omnibus security agreement.
10. See, e.g., C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] art. 2895 (1986) (Mex.). See also John E.
Rogers & Carlos de la Garza-Santos, General Goods: A Case Involving Security Interests in Inventory and
Accounts in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 5 U.S.-Mxico L.J. 3, 8-14 (1997) (describing the system
of security interests in inventory and accounts in Mexico).
11. For a German example, see Judgment of June 9, 1960, BGHZ 32,367,370.
12. For a United States Example, see U.C.C. § 9-312 (1995).
13. Compare U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1995) (Article 9 governs transactions within its scope regardless of form),
and § 9-102(2) (explicitly covering conditional sales), with § 455 BGB (Germany's separate treatment of seller's
reservation of title, a synonym for conditional sale).
14. See U.C.C. § 9-204(l) (1995).
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Finally, if the collateral is "mobile goods," it may be impossible to predict where the
goods might be at any particular time and, accordingly, to predict which country's laws
might govern. 15 Once again, this uncertainty can result in foregone, constrained, or less
profitable transactions.
III. PROSPECTS FOR HARMONIZATION
Given the costs of disharmony in the various systems governing secured credit
worldwide, we must give serious thought to the prospect of harmonizing some of the
differences. Such harmonization could take the form of special rules for international
transactions or new substantive rules adopted for both internal and external purposes.
A. The 1977 UNCITRAL Study
Almost thirty years ago, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) retained Professor Ulrich Drobnig of the Max-Planck-Institut fMr
Auslndisches und Internationales Privatrecht 16 to "make a study of the law of security
interests in principal legal systems."'17 One function of the study was to assess the need
and, perhaps, prospects for accomplishing harmonization in this area of law.
The study, published in 1977, comprehensively examined the laws of nineteen
nations, noting the similarities and differences in their treatment of the basic legal issues of
secured credit.is Not surprisingly, the differences were great. More important for our
purposes today, the Drobnig Report also contained assessments to "help to confront the
necessity or desirability of framing rules in this field at the international level, especially for
the international movement of goods subject to security interests."'19
As part of these assessments, Professor Drobnig catalogued prior attempts to achieve
some degree of international uniformity with respect to security interests. These attempts
included:
(1) A uniform conditional sales act enacted by three Scandinavian countries
(Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) during 1915-1917.
(2) UNIDROIT draft provisions of 1939 and 1951 concerning the impact of
reservation of title in the sale of certain goods.
(3) Provisions regarding the effect in bankruptcy of reservation of title in the
sale of goods in the draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention of 1970.
(4) Model reservation of title clauses contained in several "General
Conditions" elaborated by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe.
20
15. See U.C.C. § 9-103, cmt. 5, para. (b) (1995).
16. The Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law.
17. See Report of the Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Third Session, [1971] 1
Y.B. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. 129, 145, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
18. See Report of the Secretary-General. Study on Security Interests, [1977] VIII Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade
L. 171, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977 (presenting a study by Professor Ulrich Drobnig) [hereinafter Drobnlg
Report].
19. Seeid. at173.
20. See id. at 209.
[Vol. 33:173
HARMONIZING THE LAW GOVERNING SECURED CREDIT
These attempts were all ineffective in achieving uniformity in the law governing security
interests.
Professor Drobnig also analyzed at some length two recent (at the time of his study)
proposals for the harmonization of secured credit law that had been submitted to the
Council of Europe. The first such proposal was made by UNIDROIT in 1968; the other
was submitted by the Service de recherches juridiques comparatives of the CNRS of Paris
in 1972.21 Together, these proposals put forth a range of possible unification schemes,
from the "maximum" solution of creating a uniform security interest for international cases
to the much narrower suggestion for a uniform document accompanying motor vehicles on
which security interests could be entered.Y In addition, Professor Drobnig noted the
existence of a proposal to the European Community for establishing a central register for
security interests.23
Noting that none of these efforts had succeeded or appeared likely to have significant
influence, Professor Drobnig was, to say the least, not optimistic about the likelihood of
framing international rules governing security interests. With respect to a uniform law
convention, he concluded:
It would seem that international legislation in the form of a convention
providing uniform rules of substantive and conflicts law is not appropriate in
this case. As against international sales or international transportation or the
international circulation of negotiable instruments, transnational incidence of
security interests is as yet relatively moderate. It would probably be difficult to
obtain sufficient government support for an international conference dealing
with the relatively technical topic of security interests; and even if the text of an
international instrument could be agreed upon, national parliaments would
probably be slow and perhaps even reluctant to ratify such a text.24
With respect to the advisability of developing recommendations to nations for the
adoption of rules that would promote uniformity, Professor Drobnig was dismissive: "Mere
recommendations, even if emanating from an international organization of the highest
repute, will not command sufficient moral or other support for adoption by any sizable
number of states."2
Only with respect to the possibility of developing a model law in this area was
Professor Drobnig's view less bleak. Even there, however, his relative optimism was
tempered with doubt: "Perhaps moral persuasion or intellectual insight into the virtues of
the model rules will move some States to adopt them. Others may need persuasion by more
effective means such as insistence on the part of international financing institutions. 26
B. Is 1997 Different?
There is reason to believe that the pessimism of Professor Drobnig in 1977, however
strongly justified at the time, should not govern decisions as to whether and how to seek or
achieve harmonization in 1997. After all, much has changed in the twenty years since the
Drobnig study. For example:
21. See id. at210-11.
22. See id. at211-12.





TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
(1) Practical barriers to international commerce (arising from communications
and travel barriers, for example) have lessened dramatically. Accordingly,
today there is a significantly greater demand for international commercial
transactions of all kinds, including secured credit, than was the case twenty
years ago.
(2) Several nations have joined the United States in enacting secured credit
laws reflecting the concepts and policy choices on which Article 9 of the
• 27
Uniform Commercial Code is based.
(3) The fall of command economies following the collapse of most communist
regimes has resulted in opportunities for the wholesale rewriting of the
commercial laws of many countries in order to make market economies
workable.
(4) Organizations outside the United States, such as the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have drafted and proposed for
adoption model acts governing secured transactions.28 The EBRD Model
Act is particularly significant because it deviates from many traditional
European norms and, instead, is compatible with the structure of the
secured transactions system created by U.C.C. Article 9.
(5) The World Bank and other organizations have actively pushed for
modernization of the secured credit laws of many nations.29
(6) More recently, work has begun on two conventions concerning
international secured credit. UNIDROIT is preparing a convention on
security interests in mobile goods,30 and UNCITRAL is preparing a
convention on assignment of accounts receivable.
31
Accordingly, I would respectfully suggest that in the twenty years since the
UNCITRAL report, the international secured transactions landscape has changed
dramatically, requiring a rethinking of that study's pessimism. Particularly within the last
decade, initiatives for the reform of both international and domestic law governing secured
transactions have mushroomed. While many of these initiatives are still in progress and
uncertain of success, modernization and harmonization are no longer far-fetched dreams.
27. For example, see the enactment in most anglophone Canadian provinces of Personal Property Security
Acts based on similar concepts to those in U.C.C. Article 9. See, e.g., The Personal Property Security Act, 1967,
ch. 73, 1967 S.O. 305 (Ont.); see also Jacob S. Ziegel, The New Provincial Chattel Security Regimes, 70 CAN.
BAR REV. 681 (1991) (discussing provincial property security legislation generally).
28. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL LAW ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS (1994).
29. See, e.g., World Bank Report, supra note 8.
30. See International Interests in Mobile Equipment, <http://www.agora.stm.itlunidroit/english/newsnews-
97-2.htm> (reporting on the progress of the efforts to draft Uniform Rules on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment).
31. See Working Group on Int'l Contract Principles, UNCITRAL, Revisedrticles on the Draft Convention
on Assignment in Receivables Financing (Apr. 23, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9AVG.IIAVP.93,
<http://www.un.or.atuncitrall> [hereinafter UNCITRAL Receivables Project]. The most recent draft of this
convention is available from a number of sources on the Internet. On the American Bar Association site,
<http://www.abanet.org/>, the United States delegation to the Working Group drafting the Convention (of which
the author of this article is a member) posts from time to time other documents of use in tracking the progress of
this convention, including reports of the discussions at working group meetings and drafts annotated with the
comments of the U.S. delegation as to the importance ofvarious issues.
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The following is a description of some of the current initiatives that are changing the
face of secured credit law around the world. There are certainly others, as the list changes
almost daily, but this sampling illustrates the pace of reform.
1. Initiatives by International Organizations
(a) UNIDROIT
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has, over
the years, developed several conventions in the commercial law area. Two recent
initiatives concern the law of secured credit. Each deals with an important subset of the
commercial finance world in which international transactions place great stress on the
system. The first initiative, already completed, concerns factoring, while the second
concerns interests in mobile goods.
(i) Factoring
First, UNIDROIT addressed many of the difficulties attendant in international
factoring. Factoring is a common method of commercial finance in which a merchant who
sells goods or services on credit can transform its rights to receive money from its
customers in the future to cash in the present by selling those rights to a financier, or
"factor," who will undertake to collect from the customers. While factoring, at least in
form, involves a sale of an asset (the receivable owed by the customer) rather than a credit
transaction, factoring is so closely associated with secured credit, both historically32 and
functionally, 33 that it is often governed by secured credit laws. 34
When a merchant in one country sells goods on credit to a buyer in another country, a
complex factoring "chain" may result. Take the case of a manufacturer of clothing in
South Korea who sells some overcoats to a wholesaler in California on open account. The
Korean seller now has an asset (the account owed by the California wholesaler) that it
would like to convert to cash. The seller probably has financing contacts and expertise in
South Korea, but not in California, and therefore seeks out a factor located in South Korea
to whom to sell the account. A typical South Korean factor would be willing to purchase
the account but, because the South Korean factor is likely to be limited by cost and
unfamiliarity in its ability to enforce the claim against the California wholesaler if the
wholesaler does not pay voluntarily, the factor would likely only purchase the account at a
steep discount. This discount would be significantly less, however, if the South Korean
factor could sell its interest in the account to a California factor, who could much more
easily enforce it if necessary. Through informal contacts and organizations such as Factors
Chain International, it is often possible for factors in the account creditor's country to
identify factors in the debtor's country to arrange such inter-factor transfers. The result, in
many international credit transactions, is a series of transfers of the account receivable with
international dimensions. The initial transfer (in the example above, from the South
32. See generally 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 5.1 (1965)
(introducing "factors" generally and factor's liens specifically).
33. Once one gets beyond the simplest transactions, it is often difficult to distinguish a "sale" of a
receivable from a loan secured by it. See U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 2 (1995).
34. See, e.g., idL See also UNCITRAL Receivables Project, supra note 31.
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Korean manufacturer to the South Korean factor) is a domestic transfer of an international
claim, while the second transfer (South Korean factor to California factor) is an
international assignment. Are these assignments enforceable against other claimants of the
receivable, such as the bankruptcy trustee? Must the account debtor pay the ultimate
transferee (the California factor), or may it insist on paying only the party with whom it
dealt? The laws of the world's nations differ significantly with respect to such questions.
To answer these questions and others, in 1988 UNIDROIT promulgated a Convention
on International Factoring. 5 While this Convention is limited in scope and has few
signatories to date, it is nonetheless a landmark, demonstrating that it is possible to reach an
international consensus on difficult legal questions governing international secured finance.
(ii) Mobile Goods
Another matter on the UNIDROIT agenda is a convention concerning security
36interests in mobile goods. Under most legal regimes, a security interest in goods is
37governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the goods are located. This causes
problems occasionally when the goods are moved to a different jurisdiction, but these
problems are for the most part workable. What if, however, the goods are of the sort that,
by their nature, move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction? Two good examples of such goods
are railroad cars and airplanes. The normal rule-that location of the goods is paramount in
determining the governing law-would lead to chaos, as creditors would have to adjust
their status daily. Accordingly, many secured credit systems have special rules to
determine the governing law for mobile goods. Of course, as is not surprising in the
international arena, these rules differ significantly from nation to nation. The current
UNIDROIT effort is an attempt at an international convention in this area.
(b) UNCITRAL
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has also
produced several conventions and model laws in the commercial area. Since 1995, its
major ongoing project has been the development of a convention that would govern
international accounts receivable financing, a subject which in the United States is within
the scope of U.C.C. Article 9.38 This project is in part concerned with transactions that
would also be within the scope of the UNIDROIT Factoring Convention, but goes much
further. It would govern virtually any international assignment of a receivable and any
assignment (domestic or international) of an international receivable (that is, a receivable
for which the debtor and creditor are in different nations).39 Since there are at least three
parties involved in a receivables financing transaction-the account debtor, the account
35. Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Conventions on International
Factoring and International Financial Leasing: Final Act and Text of Two Conventions, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
922.
36. See International Interests in Mobil Equipment, supra note 30.
37. Interestingly enough, the United States, which has followed this rule, may be about to move away from
it in part. The most recent drafts of Revised Article 9 provide that perfection or non-perfection of a security
interest in goods is governed by the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located, rather than the jurisdiction in
which the goods are located. See, e.g., Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, January 1998
Draft <http:lwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclucc9/ucc9198.htm>.
38. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1995).
39. See UNCITRAL Receivables Project, supra note 31, art. 1.
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creditor/assignor/debtor, 40 and the assignee/creditor/secured party4 --there are myriad
problems currently facing such transactions. Can the accounts be assigned (either
absolutely or as security) without the consent of the account debtor? Can accounts be
assigned without notice to the account debtor? May a bulk of accounts be assigned in a
single contract, or must individual assignments be executed? May one contract be used to
assign not only currently existing accounts, but also accounts that will not come into
existence until sometime in the future? How does a secured party ensure that it will have
priority with respect to the account over competing claimants from the secured party's
country? What of priorities over claimants from other countries? Will the interest in the
account survive the bankruptcy of the assignor/debtor? The UNCITRAL Working Group
addressing these issues has met three times and has tentatively resolved many of these
issues.42 The remaining issue that has garnered the most attention, though, may well be the
most important: Will perfection and priority of interests in receivables be determined by
public notice filing (as is the case in the United States, Canada, and some other nations), or
by a different method in which information about security interests is less available to the
public and potential lenders?
It should also be noted that both the UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL initiatives deal with
a specific type of secured transaction rather than with secured transactions generally. This
probably increases the likelihood that the rules that emerge from these initiatives will gain
widespread ratification or enactment, because adoption of those rules will not require
nations to reconceptualize the entire field of secured credit. To the extent, however, that
adoption of these rules in countries without modem secured transactions laws will provide
an opening into the legal cultures of those countries, they might provide the precursor to
more general reform in the future.
2. Foreign Law Initiatives
There are currently efforts to reform domestic secured transactions law in many
nations throughout the world. The total number of such initiatives is difficult to ascertain,
however, because there is no central clearinghouse for this information. Current initiatives
include, but are by no means limited to, initiatives in former Soviet republics, Soviet-
dominated states, and other developing economies reforming under the World Bank.
(a) Initiatives in Former Soviet Republics and Soviet-Dominated States
(i) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
In 1994, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) released
the final draft of its Model Law on Secured Financing.43 The Model Law was drafted to
serve as the basis for the enactment of modem secured transactions laws in the nations of
40. U.C.C. Article 9 refers to this party as the "debtor." See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1995).
41. U.C.C. Article 9 refers to this party as the "secured party," even if the transaction is an outright sale of
the account rather than a "true" secured transaction. See U.C.C. § 9-105(I)(m) (1995).
42. See Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat, in UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
CREDIT TRANSFERS at 14-24, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.17 (1994).
43. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL LAW ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 28.
1998]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Central and Eastern Europe.44 While the Model Law is not ideal from an American
perspective, it nonetheless may provide an effective catalyst to aid the nations for whom it
was developed in moving toward a domestic secured financing regime that could enhance
the availability of credit to their residents, both internally and from other nations.
(ii) CEELI
The American Bar Association, through its Central and Eastern European Law
Initiatives (CEELI) Project, has been providing assistance to former Soviet republics and
nations formerly in the Soviet sphere in the development of their domestic law.45  The
assistance includes educational efforts in particular substantive areas of the law and
assistance in the drafting of legal codes. In many cases, CEELI assistance has been in the
46area of secured transactions.
(iii) The IRIS Project
The University of Maryland is a sponsor of the Institutional Reform and the Informal
Sector (IRIS) Project.47 This project has provided both substantive and technical input to
nations upgrading their secured transactions systems, particularly in the area of filing and
registration systems."
(iv) The Commercial Law Project for Ukraine
The Commercial Law Project for Ukraine is an independent project, financed in part
with United States government grants, to aid the Ukrainian government in developing a
comprehensive body of business law for that nation as it makes the transition to a market
economy. One focus of the project has been the development of laws that govern security
interests.
44. See id at v.
45. See, e.g., Janet Key, Old Countries, New Rights, 80 A.B.A. J. 68, 68-69 (1994); Spencer Weber
Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
557, 561, 569 (1994). See also Central and East European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, American
Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative (visited Oct. 10, 1997),
<http://www.abanet.org/eeeli/home.html>.
46. See Key, supra note 45, at 68-69. See also Central and East European Law Initiative, American Bar
Association, Commercial Law (visited Oct. 10, 1997) <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/commercial.html>; Central
and East European Law Initiative, American Bar Association, CEELI's Activities in Latvia (visited Oct. 10,
1997) <http:/lwww.abanet.orgleeelillatvia.html> (providing examples of CEELI assistance).
47. See William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly
Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 437, 446 (1996) (discussing IRIS assistance
provided to the Mongolians in drafting antitrust law). See also IRIS: History and Goals (visited Oct. 10, 1997)
<http:llwww.inform.umd.edulEdReslCollegeslBSOS/DeptsllRIS/present.html>.
48. See Kovacic, supra note 47, at 446, 460 (detailing the author's experiences helping draft a Mongolian
antimonopoly law). See also IRIS Field Programs (visited Oct. 10, 1997) <http://www.inform.umd.edu/
EdRes/Colleges/BSOS/Depts/IRIS/field.html>; Preface (visited Oct. 10, 1997) <http://www.inform.
umd.edu/EdRes/Colleges/BSOS/Depts/IRIS/Collapref.html> (providing examples of IRIS assistance).
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(b) Other Developing Economies (World Bank Projects)
The World Bank has recently linked many of its lending operations to reform of
secured transactions laws in the debtor nations. Nations in which projects to reform
secured transactions law financed by the World Bank are underway or are planned include
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, Peru, El Salvador, and Uruguay. The World Bank is
also working jointly with the Inter-American Development Bank in Mexico and with the
EBRD in Bulgaria.4 9
(c) NAFTA Countries
The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, located at the University of
Arizona, has been quite active in encouraging the development of modem secured
transactions law throughout the three-nation NAFTA complex. Its primary impact,
however, is in Mexico.
51
(d) Developed Countries
Many developed nations around the world, from Israel to New Zealand, are
considering modernization of their secured transactions laws. 2 These efforts are at various
stages and, of course, have differing prospects of success.
Perhaps the most important ongoing developments are the international law-making
efforts of UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL. After all, the mere fact that a large number of
nations have gotten together in these two efforts suggests a degree of consensus, rarely
achieved in the past, that there is a problem that should be dealt with.
Of the two projects, the UNCITRAL receivables project, if successful, has the greater
potential for transforming the international credit marketplace. Receivables financing is
simply bigger business than the financing of mobile goods. While much progress has been
made to date on the UNCITRAL project, there are important issues not yet resolved within
this effort that threaten its ultimate success. Substantial agreement has been reached on the
formalities necessary to transfer an interest in receivables and the rights of the transferee as
against the account debtor. However, no consensus has been reached on the topic of
priorities. Some nations, such as the United States, have advocated a priority system based
on notice filing of the transferee's interest, while other nations have advocated a first-in-
time, first-in-right rule based on the creation of the transferee's interest. In addition, no
consensus has been struck concerning the scope of the Convention's rules. While it is
agreed that they will apply to both assignments of international receivables53 and
international assignments of receivables, 54 it is not yet settled whether the Convention
49. See generally John W. Head, Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank
and Other Multilateral Development Banks, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 214 (1996).
50. See TODD C. NELSON & RONALD C.C. CUMING, HARMONIZATION OF THE SECURED FINANCING LAWS
OF THE NAFTA PARTNERS: Focus ON MExico 4 (1995).
51. See id. at l.
52. See, e.g., John Regis Coogan, et. al., Central European Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 495, 495 (1997).
53. An "international receivable" is a receivable for which the account debtor and account creditor are
located in different nations. See UNCITRAL Receivables Financing, supra note 31, art 3.
54. An "international assignment" of receivables is one for which the assignee and the account
creditor/assignor are located in different nations. See id.
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applies if only some of the parties to the assignment are located in nations that are
"contracting states. ' 5  Some countries would prefer that a rule that required all three
principal parties (account debtor, account creditor/assignor, and assignee) be located in
contracting states for the convention's rules to apply. Others would require only the
assignor to be in a contracting state, or only the assignor and assignee.
One of the often-ignored challenges associated with the LUNCITRAL project is that it
might create an unstable equilibrium. The rules governing transactions within the scope of
the Convention will necessarily cause tension when they affect transactions outside the
scope of the Convention. For example, assuming arguendo that the Convention adopts a
first-in-time priority system based on notice filing for international transactions governed
by the Convention, there will be significant tensions when the Convention rules are applied
to a transaction in a nation with priority rules for domestic transactions based solely on the
date of the assignment of the receivables (with no filing required).
To illustrate this point, imagine an account creditor in Atlantis, a nation whose
domestic priority rules are based on time of assignment without any requirement of filing or
registration. On July 1, the account creditor assigns some domestic accounts (i.e. accounts
for which the account debtor is located in Atlantis) to Assignee #1 who is also located in
Atlantis. On August 1, the account creditor assigns those same accounts to Assignee #2
who is located in the United States; assume further that Assignee #2 complies with the
notice filing requirements of the Convention. This second assignment is international and
thereby governed by the convention's rules. Under those rules, Assignee #2 would have
priority against competing claimants.5 6 Under the time of assignment rule that governs
domestic assignments, however, Assignee #1 would have priority over competing
claimants. As between Assignee #1 and Assignee #2, who should have priority?
If Assignee #1 has priority, the convention's rules will be of little utility because an
assignee with priority under those rules might still lose to a domestic assignee under the
different priority rules governing domestic transactions. If, on the other hand, Assignee #2
has priority, then presumably Assignee #1 could have protected its interests by filing in the
international system. Yet, if this is the case, well advised creditors in Assignee #1's place
will have a strong incentive to make an international filing. If so, the convention rule,
applicable by its terms only to international transactions, will subtly change ways of doing
business domestically. Thus, whatever equilibrium of credit practices is initially created by
the Convention will inexorably evolve into a system in which the rules governing
international transactions determine much domestic conduct.
C. The ALI International Secured Transactions Project
In May 1997, the American Law Institute (ALI) officially commenced the
International Secured Transactions Project. The Project has as its stated goal "to promote
and assist the development of effective and efficient legal regimes for secured transactions
in the contexts of international law, United States domestic law, and the domestic law of
other nations." 5 7 Those goals are stated in the somewhat non-specific language in which
institutions such as the ALI often articulate their objectives. A closer look is required to get
a good sense of the project, both functionally and operationally.
55. "Contracting states" are nations that have signed and ratified the Convention.
56. See UNCITRAL Receivables Financing, supra note 31, art. 23(4).
57. See Neil B. Cohen, The International Secured Transactions Project: A Proposal and Outline 3 (1997)
(copy on file with the Texas International Law Journal) [hereinafter International Secured Transactions Project].
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The proposal for the International Secured Transactions Project identifies two
functions for it. The first is "participation in the United States component of international
lawmaking."5 8 While the contours of this involvement remain to be developed, the ALI
anticipates cooperative involvement with the Office of Private International Law of the
State Department's Office of Legal Adviser in the process by which the United States
negotiates and ratifies international conventions related to international secured
transactions. 9 Noting that the development of international commercial law is not only
critically important in its own right and has a significant impact on domestic law and
commerce generally, the Project's proposal points out that such international law will have
its greatest impact in areas that are now governed domestically by the U.C.C.6° Thus, as
international transactions make up an increasing portion of the economy, the law governing
those transactions will increasingly displace the U.C.C. if the two do not develop
harmoniously. The U.C.C., of course, is a joint product of the ALI and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). By participating in the
negotiation and ratification processes, the ALI will also be continuing its long-term
investment in developing American commercial law.
The second function identified for the International Secured Transactions Project is
the facilitation of the international development of secured transaction regimes. 61 This
development may have three aspects. First, the Project hopes to play a helpful role in
62developing domestic law governing secured transactions in other nations. As World Bank
studies have demonstrated, the absence of efficient legal regimes governing secured
63transactions significantly diminishes the economic output of many nations. Realization of
the economic effect of secured transactions law has led a number of countries to consider
establishing or modernizing their legal systems in this regard. The International Secured
Transactions Project will try to facilitate this legal development by functioning as a
resource center for nations embarking on efforts to formulate modem secured transactions
law.6 In this role, the Project can provide expertise and consultative services, as well as
model legislation (and articulate the legal and economic theory supporting it) for such
lawmaking efforts.
Second, the Project will set out to be a significant force in developing the common
consensus necessary to accomplish broad-based international secured transactions law
65
reforms. The current UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT efforts to develop international rules
in the area of secured transactions are confined to particular business contexts. While those
contexts (mobile goods and receivables financing) are important, even if both efforts are
successful the law governing those transactions will fall short of a broad and integrated
international secured transactions system. Yet breadth and integration are often seen as two
of the reasons that U.C.C. Article 9 has been such a resounding success. However, the
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT efforts can, if handled properly, be useful precursors to such
broad-based law making. The Project might well play a role in building a consensus for
general legal rules governing international secured transactions from the successes of more
particularized endeavors.
Third, while U.C.C. Article 9 has served the United States's internal commercial
interests well, it is likely that the domestic legal system of which Article 9 is a part might,
58. Id. at 4.
59. See id at 6.
60. See id. at 4-5.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 4.
63. See, e.g., World Bank Report, supra note 8.
64. See International Secured Transactions Project, supra note 57, at 5.
65. See id.
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from time to time, need augmentation in order to appropriately facilitate and govern
international secured transactions. Efforts in that regard are already being undertaken
within the Article 9 revision process and are likely to be considered in the U.C.C. Article 1
revision process, as well.66 Nonetheless, both of those projects are of finite duration,
culminating in the promulgation of revised drafts of those articles. Yet, the need for
accommodation of international transactions will continue indefinitely and might involve
the development of legal rules outside the U.C.C. context. Thus, the International Secured
Transactions Project may also serve the role of sounding the alarm when there is a need for
domestic law to adjust in order to accommodate international commerce, as well as taking
the lead in developing needed legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The events of the last decade have given us an opportunity to harmonize the law of
secured credit to an extent not imaginable only twenty years ago. Harmonization efforts, if
successful, can lower the cost of international credit transactions, making more credit
available at a lower cost. The potential benefit of harmonization is so great that it has
generated multiple harmonization efforts, yet only the passage of time will determine which
efforts, if any, succeed. The increasing globalization of the credit economy suggests,
however, that the prospects are significantly greater than in the past.
66. See Uniform Law Commissioners Drafts <http:lwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulelulc.htm> (containing
drafts and Reporter's Notes for proposed revised U.C.C. §§ 1-302, 9-307 (Sept. 1997 draft)).
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